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NOTES 
39 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—SKIRTING THE WARRANT CLAUSE: STATE 
V. HARRIS AND THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION 
Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that 
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the 
means—to declare that the government may commit crimes in 
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would 
bring terrible retribution.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are at home one evening when the police barge 
into your house without knocking, serve you with a temporary 
restraining order you know nothing about, and simultaneously execute a 
search warrant.  The police place you under arrest, force you to open 
your safe to allow them to search it, and even bring in dogs.  Now 
imagine your indignation when you discover that you are not being 
prosecuted for the underlying grounds of the restraining order, but rather 
the results of the search conducted in your home—and the only basis for 
this warrant is the uncorroborated word of your ex-significant other.  
You would think your constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
government searches of your home has been violated.  But the highest 
court in New Jersey disagrees. 
In State v. Harris the New Jersey Supreme Court held that domestic 
violence search warrants based on reasonable cause will suffice in place 
of warrants based on probable cause under the statutory scheme of the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.2  Recognizing that the 
Constitution explicitly states that warrants should be based on probable 
cause,3 the high court mentioned the special needs exception without 
analyzing whether it fit the situation and moved on with its analysis.4  
The situation at issue, trying to control the combination of domestic 
violence and deadly weapons, is admittedly a very challenging one.5  
 
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
2. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 18 (N.J. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 
2012). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2. 
4. Harris, 50 A.3d at 24-26. 
5. See generally Lisa Memoli & Gina Plotino, Enforcement or Pretense: The Courts 
and the Domestic Violence Act, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39 (1993) (discussing some of the 
cases and lapses in enforcement that led to the push to change the statute in New Jersey); 
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But that is not reason enough to dispense with constitutional rights.6 
Section I of this Note will lay out the different pieces that make up 
the puzzle of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in State v. 
Harris.  Part I.A presents a brief overview of the warrant clause.  Part 
I.B explains how the statutory scheme of the Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act (PDVA) operates.  Part I.C recounts the facts and 
procedural history leading up to the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s 
decision in State v. Harris.7 
Section II argues that the constitutional requirement that “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”8 cannot be circumvented 
by way of the special needs exception in this case.9  The majority in 
Harris held, for the first time, that reasonable cause to believe that 
weapons were present and that there was a serious risk of harm to the 
victim was sufficient to issue a search warrant under section 25-18(j) of 
the PDVA.10  Parts II.A through D discuss the elements of the special 
needs exception to the warrant requirement and assert that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court erred in its conclusion that the PDVA scheme 
qualifies as such an exception. 
Section III explores the emergency aid and community caretaking 
exceptions to the warrant requirement and contends that neither of them 
replaces nor excuses the requirement of probable cause for search 
warrants under the PDVA.  Finally, Section IV compares New Jersey’s 
approach to tackling the serious problem of domestic violence involving 
deadly weapons with the approaches of several other states and proposes 
the adoption of the standard suggested by the dissenting justices in 
Harris. 
 
Michael Luo, In Some States, Gun Rights Trump Orders of Protection, N.Y. TIMES (March 
17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/facing-protective-orders-and-allowed-to-ke 
ep-guns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&&pagewanted=print. 
6. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
7. 50 A.3d at 18-21. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2.  The New Jersey Constitution uses nearly identical 
wording to provide the same protection to its citizens.  N.J. CONST. art.I, ¶ 7 (“no warrant 
shall issue except upon probable cause . . . .”). 
9. Harris, 50 A.3d at 31 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“The United States Supreme Court has 
never suggested—even remotely—that the special-needs doctrine would justify a home search 
in circumstances such as presented here.”). 
10. Id. at 27 (majority opinion) (“Here…the domestic violence search . . .was entirely 
proper.”); id. at 32 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“We have never directly addressed whether the 
[possession and heightened risk of danger to the victim] prongs for the issuance of a search 
warrant . . . can be based on less than probable cause.”). 
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I. THE LAW AND THE FACTS OF STATE V. HARRIS 
A.    The Warrant Clause 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.11  This protection extends to both civil and criminal searches.12  
The framers of the Constitution were concerned with protecting the 
security of the people’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”13  
Particularly, the Supreme Court has declared that the Fourth Amendment 
is aimed primarily at protecting unreasonable physical intrusions by the 
government into the home.14 
If searches and seizures are conducted without a warrant, they are 
considered presumptively unreasonable.15  The Fourth Amendment 
states “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”16  The Supreme Court has 
explicitly affirmed a straightforward reading of the Fourth Amendment 
by relying on its plain text in holding: “The Constitution prescribes … 
that where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, 
it is also of such a nature as to require probable cause.”17 
 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1. 
12. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (“[W]e have held the Fourth 
Amendment applicable to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities.”); see also 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 2 
(1997) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment applies equally to civil and criminal law enforcement.  Its 
text speaks to all government searches and seizures, for whatever reason.  Its history is not 
uniquely bound up with criminal law.”). 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1. 
14. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”). 
15. Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) 
(“[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without 
proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”), superseded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) 
(“Absence of any judicial approval is persuasive authority that it is unlawful.”).  But see 
AMAR, supra note 12, at 5-10 (arguing that the construction of the Fourth Amendment and the 
historical evidence weigh against a presumption of unreasonableness in the absence of a 
warrant). 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2. 
17. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 (1987).  But see Barry Jeffrey Stern, 
Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1402 (1994) (“[T]he pre-
constitutional history does not establish that the framers intended the Fourth Amendment to 
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Realizing that the demands of public safety do not always allow for 
the process of obtaining a warrant,18 the Court has come to recognize 
several “well-delineated exceptions” to the presumptive warrant 
requirement.19  In specific situations, the warrant, or even the underlying 
probable cause, is forgiven.  Where the Court has decided that the 
warrant is for one reason or another impracticable, the Court instead uses 
an interest-balancing test to ensure that the search is “reasonable” under 
the Fourth Amendment.20 
In particular, this Note focuses on the special needs exception to the 
warrant requirement, both because the New Jersey Supreme Court relied 
on it and because it seems to be the most applicable exception to the 
searches conducted under the PDVA.  In order for this exception to 
apply: (1) there must be a “special[] need beyond” ordinary law 
enforcement purposes;21 (2) the subject(s) of the search must have a 
reduced expectation of privacy;22 and (3) the requirement of obtaining a 
warrant or probable cause prior to conducting a search must be a 
practical hindrance to protecting the special need.23  If these conditions 
are met, a search warrant based on probable cause is replaced with 
interest-balancing to determine the reasonableness of the search.24 
B.     The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 and Its         
Interpretation 
The current version of the PDVA25 was enacted in 1991, repealing 
the earlier statute of the same name originally enacted in 1981.26  The 
 
preclude a warrant requirement for searches and seizures that are constitutionally reasonable 
but not supported by the traditional definition of probable cause.”). 
18. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (listing several 
circumstances in which the warrant requirement has been waived for reasons relating to 
protection of the public). 
19. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
20. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403-04 (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.’  Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions . . . . An action is 
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment . . . viewed objectively.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
21. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
22. Id. at 348-49 (Powell, J., concurring). 
23. Id. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
24. See id. at 351. 
25. For the purposes of this Note, the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA) 
encompasses N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17 to -33 (West 2012). 
26. See generally Maura Beth Johnson, Note, Home Sweet Home?: New Jersey’s 
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 234 (1993). 
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New Jersey Legislature sought “to assure victims of domestic violence 
the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.”27  The 
Legislature “stress[ed] that the primary duty of a law enforcement 
officer when responding to a domestic violence call is to enforce the 
laws allegedly violated and to protect the victim.”28  According to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, “[b]ecause the [Prevention of] Domestic 
Violence Act is remedial in nature, it is to be liberally construed to 
achieve its salutary purposes.”29  In order to accomplish these goals, the 
PDVA provides both criminal and civil remedies.30 
On the criminal side, when a police officer has probable cause to 
believe that domestic violence has occurred, he or she can arrest the 
suspected abuser and “upon observing or learning that a weapon is on 
the premises, seize any weapon that the officer reasonably believes 
would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury.”31  However, 
according to New Jersey’s Domestic Violence Procedures Manual: “If 
the domestic violence assailant or the possessor of the weapon refuses to 
surrender the weapon or to allow the officer to enter the premises to 
search for the named weapon, the officer should obtain a Domestic 
Violence Warrant for the Search and Seizure of Weapons.”32  This 
search warrant is the same in both the criminal and civil contexts.33 
On the civil side, section 25-28(j) authorizes the victim to file a 
complaint with a Family Part judge seeking a temporary restraining 
order (TRO) which may include other forms of ex parte relief including 
the issuance of a warrant to search for and seize weapons.34 
Emergency relief may include forbidding the defendant from 
returning to the scene of the domestic violence, forbidding the 
defendant from possessing any firearm or other weapon... ordering 
the search for and seizure of any such weapon at any location where 
the judge has reasonable cause to believe the weapon is located and 
the seizure of any firearms purchaser identification card or permit to 
purchase a handgun issued to the defendant and any other 
 
27. § 2C:25-18. 
28. Id. 
29. Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 393 (N.J. 1998). 
30. Id. 
31. § 2C:25-21 (emphasis added). 
32. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEDURES MANUAL, § 3.10.1(F) 
(2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/family/ dvprcman.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter MANUAL]. 
33. To see a blank affidavit and search warrant form, see MANUAL, supra note 32, at 
app. 19. 
34. § 2C:25-28(j); MANUAL, supra note 32, § 5.10.3. 
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appropriate relief.35 
This Note will focus in particular on the search warrant authorized by 
section 2C:25-28(j) which is at issue in Harris.36 
While section 2C:25-28(j) acknowledges that there must be 
“reasonable cause” as to the location of the weapon before a judge 
orders a search and seizure of any weapons,37 there is no further 
direction regarding what kind of showing is needed to issue the search 
warrant.38  A New Jersey appellate court interpreted the search warrant 
issued under the PDVA to require “reasonable cause” as to three 
elements in State v. Johnson:39 
[W]here there is reasonable cause to believe that, (1) an act of 
domestic violence has been committed by [the] defendant (2) the 
defendant possesses or has access to a firearm or other weapon ...  
and (3) defendant’s possession or access to that weapon poses a 
heightened or increased risk of danger to the victim, then the 
issuance of a search warrant as authorized by [section] 2C:25-28j 
does not violate Fourth Amendment principles.40 
“Reasonable cause,” while not defined in the PDVA itself, has been 
considered “akin to ‘reasonable suspicion,’ which New Jersey courts 
have found to be a more relaxed standard than ‘probable cause.’”41  To 
meet reasonable suspicion, “[a]n officer must be able to ‘point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’”42 
 
35. § 2C:25-28(j) (emphasis added). 
36. Although the facts in State v. Harris only concerned the civil statute, as mentioned, 
the search warrant is available to police in the criminal context as well.  State v. Harris, 50 
A.3d 15, 18 (N.J. 2012).  See MANUAL, supra note 32, § 3.10.1(F). 
37. § 2C:25-28(j). 
38. Harris, 50 A.3d at 32 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
39. State v. Johnson, 799 A.2d 608, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) disapproved 
by State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791 (N.J. 2007).  In Johnson, the appellate division affirmed the 
suppression of evidence where a search warrant issued under § 2C:25-28(j) for weapons 
lacked specificity as to the location, and led to marijuana but no weapons.  Id. at 614-15. 
40. Id. at 626.  This test was incorporated into the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEDURES 
MANUAL.   See MANUAL, supra note 32, at § 5.10.4. 
41. State v. Perkins, 817 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) abrogated by 
State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012).  New Jersey courts have held that “[p]robable cause 
is… a well-grounded suspicion or belief.”  State in Interest of J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1273 (N.J. 
1997) (quoting State v. DeSimone, 288 A.2d 849, 850 (N.J. 1972)).  Other courts have found 
similar Supreme Court language to be the equivalent of a probable cause standard.  See United 
States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “the Court’s inquiry under the 
‘probable cause’ and ‘reason to believe’ standards is the same . . . .”). 
42. Perkins, 817 A.2d at 369-70.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
acknowledges that the concepts of probable cause and reasonable suspicion are difficult to 
2014] SKIRTING THE WARRANT CLAUSE 45 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Dispoto corrected the 
interpretation by the appellate court in Johnson, holding that probable 
cause is required to issue a search warrant in regards to the first element 
of the Johnson test: whether an act of domestic violence had occurred.43  
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not, however, overrule “reasonable 
cause” as the standard for the other two elements necessary for the 
issuance of a warrant for the search and seizure of weapons under 
section 2C:25–28(j).44 
Up until the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Harris, the 
searches authorized under the PDVA had not been used to “advance a 
criminal investigation against an alleged abuser.”45  Furthermore, the 
Harris court expressly held, for the first time, that “[section] 2C:25–
28(j) ... permits issuance of a warrant upon reasonable cause.”46 
C. State v. Harris 
 The victim, identified as W.J., sought and received a TRO from a 
Family Part judge.47  W.J. signed a sworn statement expressing that she 
and the defendant, Carlton Harris, had a dating relationship and that he 
had committed acts of domestic violence against her.48  These acts 
“include[d] beating her in the face, stalking her daily, repeatedly 
 
define, but has contrasted them:  
[w]e have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective 
basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, and probable cause to 
search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant 
a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found.   
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (internal citations omitted). 
43. State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791, 798 n.3 (N.J. 2007). 
44. Harris, 50 A.3d at 32 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“We have never directly addressed 
whether the remaining two prongs for the issuance of a search warrant in Johnson can be 
based on less than probable cause.”). 
45. Dispoto, 913 A.2d at 798 (“[T]he remedial protections afforded under []PDVA are 
intended for the benefit of victims of domestic violence and are not meant to serve as a pretext 
for obtaining information to advance a criminal investigation against an alleged abuser.”).  See 
also Perkins, 817 A.2d at 371 (“[U]nless the factual circumstances justify a search under a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a search and resulting seizure under [the 
PDVA] … is deemed reasonable and thereby passes constitutional muster so long as the 
results are not used to facilitate a criminal prosecution.”); State v. Johnson, 799 A.2d 608, 624 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[T]he analysis of the validity of the warrant and search 
cannot be equated with that applied to a search and seizure where the purpose is to secure 
evidence in a criminal prosecution.”). 
46. Harris, 50 A.3d at 18. 
47. State v. Harris, No. A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012). 
48. Id. 
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telephoning her at all hours, kicking in her front door, and threatening to 
kill her and her children while wielding a gun.”49  The TRO enumerated 
the expected prohibitions against communication and contact between 
the victim and defendant, and was accompanied by a search and seizure 
warrant for Mr. Harris’s guns.50  The no-knock warrant described the 
caliber of four guns and a belt of ammunition, and gave officers full 
access to the house, the garage, and the car if it was parked in the 
driveway.51 
The officers went to Mr. Harris’s residence52 that evening, placed 
Mr. Harris under arrest, and proceeded to search for the guns.53  The 
police recovered three guns and ammunition: a .308 caliber assault rifle 
in the attic-bedroom, five large capacity magazines with a Colt 
Anaconda .45 caliber revolver from a basement safe, and a Ruger P89 
handgun discovered by a gun-sniffing dog on top of the china cabinet in 
the dining room.54  The next day, the police checked the serial numbers 
of the firearms and learned that the Colt Anaconda revolver had been 
reported stolen.55  The defendant, Mr. Harris, was then indicted and 
charged with twelve criminal violations relating to the stolen revolver 
and the unlawful possession of an assault rifle and large capacity 
magazines.56 
The trial court suppressed all the evidence on the defendant’s 
motion, ruling “that weapons seized pursuant to a warrant issued under 




51. Id. at *2. 
52. From both the facts contained in the opinion of the appellate court and those in the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion, it does not appear that the victim and the defendant 
were cohabitating.  Thus, when the search was performed, it was at the defendant’s separate, 
private residence.  State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 20 (N.J. 2012). 
53. Harris, 2011 WL 813377, at *1. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id.  The full counts were:  
second-degree unlawful possession of an assault rifle, N.J.S.A.2C:39-5(f) (count 
one); third-degree possession of a loaded rifle, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(2) (count two); 
five counts fourth-degree possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine 
(counts three, four, five, six and seven), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); second-degree 
unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count eight); third-degree 
receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 20-7(a) (count nine); three counts of third-degree 
certain persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(3) (counts ten, eleven 
and twelve).   
Id. 
57. Id. at *3. 
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appellate division reversed in part and affirmed in part.58  The appellate 
court characterized the warrant as a “special needs warrant,” which prior 
cases had ruled could not be used to “gather evidence of criminal 
offenses unrelated to the domestic violence.”59  The appellate court 
therefore considered the search warrantless since the evidence was used 
to prosecute the defendant for unlawful possession.60  The court 
suppressed the stolen Colt Anaconda and remanded to discover whether 
the plain view exception61 to the warrant requirement applied to the 
assault rifle and ammunition.62 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search 
warrant based on reasonable cause issued under section 2C:25-28(j) was 
valid under the special needs exception to the warrant clause.63  In 
analyzing whether or not the weapons seized under the PDVA could be 
used as evidence in a criminal prosecution, the court reviewed the 
seizures under the plain view doctrine.64  The court remanded the case to 
the trial court to determine whether the officers knew the illegal nature 
of the weapons when they saw them during the search.65  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court did not address arguments made by the parties 
and their amici in regards to whether there was sufficient probable cause 
to justify the warrant.66  As will be discussed below, the court instead 
relied on the special needs exception, but its analysis was limited to 
mentioning that the exception was “[p]ertinent” and that the lower courts 
had used the special needs exception in their analyses.67 
 
 
58. Id. at *1. 
59. Id. at *11. 
60. Id. 
61. The plain view exception in New Jersey involves satisfying three elements: (1) the 
police officer’s presence was lawful, (2) the officer’s discovery of evidence was inadvertent, 
and (3) the seizability of the evidence was “immediately apparent.”  Id. at *11.  The defendant 
did not contest the lawfulness of the officers’ presence, and the appellate court disagreed with 
the defendant’s contest of the inadvertence requirement but remanded to determine whether 
their unlawful nature was “immediately apparent.”  Id. at *11-12. 
62. Id. at *11-12. 
63. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 25-27 (N.J. 2012). 
64. Id. at 28-31.  The Harris court’s assessment of the facts under the plain view 
doctrine will not be dealt with in this Note. 
65. Id. at 31. 
66. Id. at 21-23. 
67. Id. at 24-26. 
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II. THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY IN STATE V. 
HARRIS 
A. There Might Have Been a Special Need 
The special needs exception is applicable when there is a “special 
need[]” for a search, and ordinary law enforcement purposes would be 
hindered by a requirement to obtain a warrant and/or probable cause.68  
Some examples of “special needs” include: maintaining discipline in a 
school,69 efficiency in the workplace,70 and proper supervision of 
probationers.71  This doctrine has two branches: one requiring an 
individualized suspicion as a necessary justification for a search, and one 
that does not.72  To date, the only special needs cases in which the 
Supreme Court has not required individualized suspicion have involved 
drug testing.73  In all others, the Court has required individualized 
suspicion, albeit reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause to 
justify the search.74  In order to determine whether a special needs search 
is “reasonable” and comports with the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
engages in a balancing test: on one side is the government interest or the 
“special need,” and on the other are the privacy interests of the 
individual subject to the search.75 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of the special needs 
exception has mirrored the application by the Supreme Court of the 
 
68. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
69. Id. at 340 (majority opinion). 
70. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-22 (1987). 
71. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987). 
72. State in Interest of J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1265-66 (N.J. 1997).  Waiving 
individualized suspicion is a way of lessening the Fourth Amendment requirement that 
warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”  Id. at 1265 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2). 
73. For approved programs, see generally: Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) 
(testing of high school students seeking to participate in extracurricular activities); Vernonia 
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (testing of schoolchildren seeking to play 
interscholastic sports); Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (testing 
of customs employees seeking promotion which would involve work with illicit substances or 
carrying a firearm); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (testing of 
railroad employees).  For disapproved programs, see generally: Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (testing of pregnant women by hospital for use in cocaine 
prosecution if they did not enroll in a drug program); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) 
(testing required for candidates seeking to run for state office). 
74. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at  879 (reasonable suspicion sufficient to search home 
of probationer); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to search purse of student found smoking in the bathroom).  
75. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
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United States.76  New Jersey’s high court has applied the special needs 
doctrine with careful and thorough analysis of both precedent and facts 
in determining the applicability of the special needs exception and 
performing the accompanying balancing test.77  In contrast, the court in 
State v. Harris assumed that the special needs doctrine applied and, 
without any balancing of interests at all, replaced the probable cause 
requirement with reasonable cause.78  The court noted that there were 
“several exceptions to the general rule that a warrant based on probable 
cause must be issued prior to any search or seizure.”79  The majority 
went on to say that the special needs exception was “[p]ertinent” and 
that the lower courts had both “viewed this matter solely through the 
lens of the special needs exception.”80  It is true that the appellate 
division in State v. Harris invoked the special needs exception, but that 
opinion similarly lacked meaningful analysis and misstated the law81– 
surely not a determination warranting adoption by the higher court.82 
In State v. Harris, the court should have applied the test to 
determine whether a special need existed.  First, the court should have 
carefully examined the state interest of protecting domestic violence 
 
76. The New Jersey Supreme Court has applied it in cases where (1) “the requirements 
of the statute [are] not ‘intended to facilitate … criminal prosecution . . .,’” (2) results of the 
search were not given to the prosecutor, and (3) the warrant requirement is impractical.  State 
v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 276 (N.J. 2007).  The court then proceeds to weigh the competing 
interests.  Id. (discussing how the special needs test had been applied in State in Interest of 
J.G., 701 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1997)). 
77. In State in Interest of J.G., the court’s in-depth analysis spanned more than five of 
the fifteen total pages in determining whether there was a special need and then weighing it 
against the privacy interests of individuals who were and would be affected.  701 A.2d at 
1266-72.  Similarly, in State v. O’Hagen, the court performed an in-depth analysis, first 
making sure the special needs doctrine applied, and then carefully weighing the interests. 
O’Hagen, 914 A.2d at 277-81. 
78. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 24-26 (N.J. 2012). 
79. Id. at 24. 
80. Id.  Compare with O’Hagen, 914 A.2d at 276-81(the court went through a careful 
analysis of their prior case law, a recitation of the test, and then a careful application of the 
test before engaging in a balancing of interests, ultimately finding that the special needs 
exception made a warrant and individualized suspicion unnecessary for DNA collection of 
convicts). 
81. State v. Harris, No. A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *5-*6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012).  As will be noted in more detail in Part II.D, the appellate court 
references “‘special needs’ warrants,” which do not exist.  Id. at *5.  Compare with State in 
Interest of J.G., 701 A.2d at 1266-72 (the court went through U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
and state precedent, laid out the full definition of the special-needs exception, and then went 
through a careful application). 
82. Indeed, the Harris court noted that while the findings of fact are not typically 
disturbed by a court on appellate review, when “considering the legal conclusions and analysis 
of the trial court, [the appellate court’s] review is plenary.”  50 A.3d at 23. 
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victims from assault with deadly weapons. Had they done this, they 
might have decided this interest is beyond ordinary law enforcement 
purposes.  The court then should have looked at the interests of the 
person subject to such the search, who has an undiminished and very 
high expectation of privacy in his home. The court also should have 
examined the practicability of a warrant, finding that the statutory 
scheme incorporates a warrant.83  Finally, balancing these interests, the 
court would have found that the law enforcement officers were not 
excused from their constitutional requirement to obtain a search warrant 
based on probable cause.84 
The only element of the special needs analysis that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Harris even remotely touched on was the “special 
need,” to which they looked towards the purpose of the statute to find.85  
The court recognized that the Legislature was very clear that the purpose 
of the statute was “to assure the victims of domestic violence the 
maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.”86  Although the 
court did not specifically state this under a special needs analysis, this 
may be “beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”87  As the 
Legislature said, the primary purpose of the statute is to protect victims 
of domestic violence from further harm, not to obtain evidence for 
criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of the alleged violence.88  
Furthermore, the search warrant is authorized by the civil part of the 
statute in conjunction with a TRO, designed to protect the victim from 
harm.89  Therefore, protecting victims from assaults with weapons 
through civilly authorized searches and seizures could be classified as a 
non-law-enforcement special need.90 
If they had established that the need qualifies under the exception, 
the court should have examined how practical the warrant requirement 
was, and weighed the defendant’s privacy interest against the special 
need of the government to be excused from the warrant requirement.91  
 
83. See infra Part II.B-D. 
84. See infra Part II.B-D. 
85. Harris, 50 A.3d at 23. 
86. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2012)). 
87. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
88.  § 2C:25-18. 
89. § 2C:25-28(j). 
90. In the similar administrative-search context, the Supreme Court held that a non-law 
enforcement need is not disqualified where a legislature deals with a social problem using 
parallel means, one criminal and the other administrative, each permitting searches.  New 
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 713-15 (1987). 
91. Harris, 50 A.3d at 34 (Albin, J., dissenting) (discussing the balancing test that 
should have been applied). 
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As will be explained in detail below, if the court performed this 
balancing test at all, it would have been forced to conclude that the 
special needs doctrine does not apply.  This is because the other two 
prongs of the test cannot be satisfied: there is no diminished expectation 
of privacy of the subjects of these searches, and a warrant does not 
hinder the statutory scheme.92 
B. The Subjects of the Search Have No Diminished Expectation of 
Privacy 
The dissent in Harris emphasized that “[t]he United States Supreme 
Court has never invoked the special needs doctrine to suspend the 
probable cause/warrant requirement for the search of a home—where the 
privacy interests of the individual are at their highest—except in the case 
of a probationer.”93  The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled 
the special needs exception could apply to belongings and persons of 
students searched by school administrators;94 offices of public 
employees searched by their employers;95 and homes of probationers 
searched by probation officers.96  In each of these cases, the subject of 
the search had some lower expectation of privacy, because of the 
location of the search, their employment position, or their criminal 
background.97  The lower expectation of privacy in these instances 
results in a balancing test of the interests of both parties.  This balancing 
is a better test for the reasonableness of a search, because the 
requirement of probable cause presupposes an undiminished expectation 
of privacy. 
The search of a probationer’s home in Griffin v. Wisconsin is the 
most analogous of the Supreme Court special needs cases to the searches 
 
92. See infra Parts II.B-D. 
93. Harris, 50 A.3d at 33-34 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
94. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374 (2009) (the Court 
found a strip search of a thirteen-year-old for over-the-counter drugs unreasonable, but used a 
special needs balancing test to make that determination); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
328-29 (1985) (school administrators searched the handbag of a student while enforcing a 
school policy against smoking and discovered evidence of drug dealing). 
95. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (holding that the special needs 
exception applied to searches of employees offices by employers, but remanded to determine 
whether the search at issue in this case was reasonable). 
96. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (holding that probationers have 
a “conditioned liberty” and require close supervision as part of their probation). 
97. Id. at 868 (probationers subject to terms of their probation); O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709 (1987) (government employees at their place of work subject to supervision); 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (public schoolchildren in school subject to school 
rules). 
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under the PDVA and State v. Harris.98  In Griffin, two probation officers 
and three police officers, acting on a tip from a detective “that there were 
or might be guns in [the defendant’s] apartment,” conducted a 
warrantless search of a probationer’s home.99  This search was based 
solely on “reasonable grounds,” and the searchers successfully located 
the handgun to which the tip pertained.100  The Supreme Court accepted 
the need to supervise probationers for their own rehabilitation and to 
protect the public as a “special need.”101 
While going through the special needs analysis to determine 
whether the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the 
Court emphasized repeatedly that probationers have a diminished 
reasonable expectation of privacy.102  Even the four dissenting justices 
agreed that “[t]he probation officer is not dealing with an average 
citizen, but with a person who has been convicted of a crime.”103  In fact, 
under Wisconsin law, probationers were considered to be “in the legal 
custody of the State Department of Health and Social Services.”104 
In contrast, the defendant in State v. Harris had no diminished 
expectation of privacy, let alone one that approached the level of being 
in the legal custody of a government agency.105  When W.J. made the 
domestic violence complaint that led to the search warrant, she told the 
police that the “defendant had been arrested three months earlier for 
assaulting her and that those charges remained pending.”106  In fact, the 
defendant had not been convicted of any crime that might have 
conditioned his liberty in any way, nor had the defendant faced his 
accuser in court–he was charged once and accused twice of domestic 
 
98. Harris, 50 A.3d at 33-34 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“The United States Supreme Court 
has never invoked the special needs doctrine to suspend the probable-cause/warrant 
requirement for the search of a home—where the privacy interests of the individual are at 
their highest—except in the case of a probationer.”) (discussing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868 (1987)). 
99. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871. 
100. Id. at 871-72. 
101. Id. at 875. 
102. Id. at 874 (“To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we 
have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every 
citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
[probation] restrictions.’”) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). 
103. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 870. 
105. See State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 34 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting) (“The search 
of a probationer’s home is obviously not comparable to that of a person accused of a crime or 
a domestic violence offense.”). 
106. Id. at 19 (majority opinion). 
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violence.107  According to the statutory construction and subsequent 
interpretation of the PDVA by the New Jersey Supreme Court, even if 
the defendant had never before been accused of domestic violence, the 
police would still not have needed probable cause to obtain a warrant to 
search his house for weapons.108 
Defendants in cases like Harris have an undiminished expectation 
of privacy in their homes, not to mention the fact that defendants are 
presumed innocent until proven guilty.109  On this basis alone, the 
situation does not fall within the bounds of the special needs exception 
to the warrant clause requiring probable cause.  However, there is 
another independent basis for disqualifying this situation from the 
special needs analysis: the third element, the impracticability of the 
warrant requirement, is similarly unfulfilled.110 
C.  Requiring a Warrant Based on Probable Cause Would Not Hinder 
Procedure 
As Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion in New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant 
and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to 
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”111  In T.L.O., 
the Court recognized that the warrant and probable cause requirements 
were wholly “unsuited” to the school environment because they would 
“unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”112  More pertinent to the 
search of homes, the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin came up with three 
ways the “warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree 
with the probation system”: (1) “a magistrate rather than a probation 
officer [would] judge [] how close a supervision the probationer 
requires,” (2) delay in getting a warrant would hinder probation officers’ 
response, and (3) the deterrent aspect would be reduced.113  These 
 
107. Id. 
108. Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 394 (N.J. 1998) (holding that under the PDVA “a 
court is not obligated to find a past history of abuse before determining that an act of domestic 
violence has been committed in a particular situation”) (emphasis added). 
109. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1978). 
110. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (“[W]e have permitted exceptions 
when ‘special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
111. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
112. Id. at 340 (majority opinion). 
113. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876. 
54 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:39 
 
potential impediments to the statutory purpose and regime resulting from 
a warrant based on probable cause made “it reasonable to dispense with 
the warrant requirement.”114 
Looking at these three characteristics from the Griffin scheme, the 
PDVA differs because it would not be similarly hindered by a 
requirement to obtain a warrant based on probable cause.115  The 
decision whether to conduct a search is already determined by a neutral 
magistrate, the Family Part judge, who reviews the complaint and 
decides whether to issue a TRO and other forms of relief.116  Secondly, 
because a warrant is already required by the PDVA, requiring the 
warrant to be based on a higher standard, probable cause, would not 
create additional delay.117  Finally, there is also no similar deterrence 
aspect of the PDVA that would give subjects of searches notice of the 
fact that only reasonable cause is required.  Probationers are on notice 
because their liberty is conditioned, but people accused of domestic 
violence have no such reason to be on notice if they have not yet been 
served with the TRO and/or never have been previously accused.118  
Therefore, unlike Griffin and other special needs cases, neither a warrant 
nor probable cause is impracticable to the statutory regime.119 
In fact, the statutory scheme already requires probable cause for the 
first prong of the test, whether an act of domestic violence occurred, 
which then allows a warrant for the search and seizure of weapons to be 
issued.120  If the police are required to demonstrate probable cause for 
one of the elements to obtain the search warrant, demonstrating probable 
cause as to the other elements may be an impediment but should not be 
considered impracticable.  This is clearly not a situation contemplated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court justices in T.L.O. where “exceptional 
circumstances [of the school environment] … make the warrant and 
probable cause requirement impracticable ….”121  Failure to show 
 
114. Id. at 876-77. 
115. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 34 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting). 
116. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West 2012). 
117. See § 2C:25-28(j); Harris, 50 A.3d  at 34  (Albin, J., dissenting). 
118. Harris, 50 A.3d at 34. 
119. Id. (“I do not believe that the probable-cause requirement is impracticable in a 
statutory scheme protecting victims of domestic violence . . . .”). 
120. State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791, 798 (N.J. 2007).  As previously mentioned, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court overruled a determination by the appellate division and required 
probable cause, as opposed to reasonable cause, that an act domestic violence had occurred, 
but reasonable cause remains sufficient in regards to the other two bases for the search 
warrant: access/possession of a weapon and threat of that possession/access remained.  Id. 
121. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
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exceptional circumstances should make the special needs exception 
inapplicable, even without the lack of diminished privacy expectations 
of the subjects of the searches under the PDVA.122 
D.  The Special Needs Exception Is to Forgive the Warrant 
In one way, the Harris court’s reliance on the special needs 
exception at all seems strange.  The anomaly in Harris is that there was 
a warrant involved; all the previous special needs cases involved 
completely warrantless searches.123  The New Jersey appellate division 
in Harris incorrectly stated the law when it characterized and explained 
the search warrant at issue as a “‘special needs’ warrant.”124  The court 
stated: 
Generally, such a warrant is not issued to secure evidence in a 
criminal investigation, but to further a legitimate governmental 
interest; in other words, the warrant is directed to promote the State’s 
“special-needs.”  Special needs warrants are typically issued upon a 
showing of reasonable suspicion that a person has violated a rule or 
regulation which the State has an interest in protecting.125 
The only authority the lower court in Harris cited to support that 
statement of the law was T.L.O., which concerned a completely 
warrantless search of a student by a school administrator and created the 
special needs exception to the warrant requirement.126  If the police 
obtained a warrant, then clearly obtaining a warrant was not 
impracticable and the special needs doctrine could not apply.127 
The situation in State v. Harris presents an interesting conundrum.  
If the police officers had gone in without a warrant, as they do under the 
criminal side of the PDVA when responding to domestic violence 
calls,128 they would have had an argument for the impracticability of the 
 
122. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 320-22 (1997) (the Court distinguished 
infeasibility of individualized suspicion in prior drug testing cases from the instant case, and 
consequently the special needs balancing failed). 
123. See, e.g., State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 270 (N.J. 2007); State in Interest of 
J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1267 (N.J. 1997); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987); 
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712 (1987); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 330 (1985). 
124. State v. Harris, A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 50 
A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012). 
125. Id. 
126. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
127. See supra Part II.C. 
128. State v. Perkins, 817 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (warrantless 
search allowed because special needs covered the Fourth Amendment violation as long as 
criminal charges were not brought), abrogated by State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012). 
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warrant and come closer to falling within the scope of the special needs 
exception.129  But, as the facts occurred, the police had a warrant based 
on less than probable cause, and without the special needs exception, 
violated Mr. Harris’s Fourth Amendment rights in executing it.130  This 
is puzzling, because a warrant is supposed to offer the subject of a search 
greater protection–not less.131 
A similar construct to the warrant sanctioned by the PDVA was 
proposed by the dissent in Griffin v. Wisconsin.132  Justice Blackmun 
proposed that while the lower level of suspicion might be justified by the 
special need, the warrant itself should be retained as an added “means of 
protecting the probationer’s privacy.”133  That way, the probationer 
would still have the benefit of a neutral magistrate reviewing the facts, 
but the probation officers would still only need to meet “reasonable 
grounds” rather than probable cause.134  Justice Blackmun pointed out 
that the Court had previously made a similar exception for 
administrative warrants, which can be issued by the judiciary and are 
based on a standard less than probable cause.135 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected this proposition and 
drew a firm line between judicial warrants and administrative search 
warrants.136  The majority found that Justice Blackmun’s suggested 
solution, the solution apparently adopted by the New Jersey Legislature 
and courts under the PDVA, “is a combination that neither the text of the 
Constitution nor any of [the Court’s] prior decisions permits.”137  The 
Court then unequivocally affirmed a plain reading and application of the 
Fourth Amendment: “it remains true that ‘[i]f a search warrant be 
constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted 
to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue.’”138  
The intrusion by the government into a citizen’s home to search and 
seize weapons sanctioned by the PDVA is certainly a situation in which 
a search warrant is constitutionally required; therefore, probable cause is 
 
129. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877-78 (1987). 
130. Harris, 50 A.3d at 18. 
131. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981) (“A search warrant … is 
issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is 
located in a particular place, and therefore safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of 
his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police.”). 
132. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 882 n.1. 
136. Id. at 877-78 (majority opinion). 
137. Id. at 877. 
138. Id. at 878 (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959)). 
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the necessary foundation on which that search warrant must rely.139 
On the other hand, if the court had gone through a detailed analysis 
and found the special needs doctrine applied, would it be within the 
purview of the New Jersey Legislature to add a warrant as an extra level 
of protection to the search?  After all, courts in New Jersey have held 
that the state constitution is more protective than the Federal 
Constitution concerning Fourth Amendment rights.140  If the search 
qualifies under the special needs exception and is therefore “reasonable” 
under the Fourth Amendment, what harm could a warrant based on 
reasonable cause inflict as an extra procedural safeguard?  But, if the 
warrant is practicable after all, then how could the search be considered 
under the special needs exception in the first place?  Needless to say, this 
case poses several interesting questions for the special needs exception, 
none of which the New Jersey Supreme Court tried to answer or even 
acknowledge.  This Note does not attempt to provide an answer to them, 
but endeavors to point out that even if the components of the special 
needs test had been met, the resulting warrant under the statute would 
have been a new and interesting creature. 
In summary, the special needs exception cannot apply in State v. 
Harris, and other cases involving search warrants issued under section 
2C:25-28(j).  Even if a “special need” on the face of the statute appears 
to be outside the scope of normal law enforcement,141 the warrant and 
probable cause requirements are not impracticable, and are both, at least 
in part, already included in the statutory regime.142  Additionally, the 
high expectation of privacy that subjects have in their homes is 
undiminished and would outweigh the special need in a balancing test 
for reasonableness.143  The special needs exception therefore does not 
cover warrants based on reasonable cause issued under the PDVA 
section 2C:25-28(j).  And even if it did, this case would have been the 
first of its kind, using a warrant very close to one rejected by the 
majority in Griffin.144  Furthermore, as will be shown below, there are no 
other exceptions to the constitutional requirement for searches to be 
 
139. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (2012); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878 (quoting 
Maryland, 359 U.S. at 373). 
140. See State v. Miller, 777 A.2d 348, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“This 
authority to apply the State Constitution independently from and more broadly than the 
federal Constitution has been exercised frequently by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
respect of search and seizure issues.”). 
141. See supra Part II.A. 
142. See supra Part II.C. 
143. See supra Part II.B. 
144. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877-78. 
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supported by a warrant based on probable cause that would cover State 
v. Harris, and cases like it.145 
III.  NO OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT APPLY 
TO FACTS RESEMBLING THOSE IN STATE V. HARRIS146 
A. The Emergency Aid Doctrine Does Not Apply to Searches 
Conducted Under Section 2C:25-28(j) of the PDVA 
The emergency aid doctrine may also, at first blush, appear to cover 
the search for and seizure of weapons under the PDVA.  Like other 
exigent circumstances, the Supreme Court of the United States has held 
that police may enter a house without a warrant based on probable 
cause147 where someone is “seriously injured or threatened with such 
injury.”148  Furthermore, the standard for determining whether an 
officer’s emergency aid search is reasonable is whether there was an 
“objectively reasonable basis” to believe that a third party needed 
help.149  An argument could be made that this is precisely the situation in 
a case of domestic violence involving threats of serious injury with a 
firearm.150  Under the PDVA, there would even be probable cause that 
 
145. See infra Section III. 
146. For the purposes of this Note, I only discuss two other exceptions that come 
closest to applying in this situation; I do not intend to represent that these are the only 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, just that they are the most applicable, if ultimately 
unsuited, to search and seizure of firearms under the PDVA.  The administrative-search 
exception is not applicable because the PDVA does not enforce a “regulatory scheme.”  See 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987). 
147. For what may be obvious reasons, this doctrine is always applied to completely 
warrantless searches; if the threat were immediate, there certainly would not be time to obtain 
a warrant.  See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (finding that one of the reasons 
for refusing to apply the emergency aid doctrine was that “there [was] no suggestion that a 
search warrant could not easily and conveniently have been obtained”). 
148. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
149. Id. at 404-06.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently amended their 
interpretation of the test to eliminate any analysis of the subjective motivation of the officer 
and now require “only that: (1) the officer had ‘an objectively reasonable basis to believe that 
an emergency requires that he provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to 
prevent serious injury’ and (2) there was a ‘reasonable nexus between the emergency and the 
area or places to be searched.’”  State v. Edmonds, 47 A.3d 737, 746 (N.J. 2012) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
150. In fact, this argument was made (unsuccessfully) in a recent New Jersey case of 
reported domestic violence, also discussed infra Part III.B.  State v. Edmonds, 47 A.3d 737 
(N.J. 2012).  In that case, the police received an unverified tip from someone claiming to be 
the alleged victim’s brother that domestic violence was occurring at the victim’s residence and 
there may be a gun involved.  Id. at 740.  When the officers arrived, the victim claimed there 
was no violence, that only she and her son were in the apartment, and refused to give the 
police consent to search her residence.  Id. at 740-41.  The police entered over her objection, 
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domestic violence had occurred, and reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant had access to a gun, as well as a warrant authorizing the 
search.151 
However, the emergency aid doctrine, along with all forms of 
exigent circumstances, is premised on the immediacy of the threat, 
specifically, to a third party, and is therefore limited in both scope and 
time.152  The Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona underscored that 
when there was no longer any threat of violence on the premises, the 
emergency aid exception was no longer valid and the police were 
required to get a search warrant.153  Cases that arise under section 2C:25-
28(j) of the PDVA do not fit this emergency aid doctrine because by the 
time the officer conducts the search, the victim has already left the 
house, given a statement, and the threat of violence—the exigency—has 
already passed.154  In an emergency, a police officer can enter the home, 
secure the alleged abuser, and make sure the victim receives medical 
attention if he or she needs it, but the officer cannot proceed to search 
the premises for weapons without an appropriate warrant based on 
probable cause.155 
 
verified that her son was okay, questioned the defendant boyfriend on the couch, and 
proceeded to search for weapons.  Id. at 741.  A weapon was found under a pillow, the 
defendant claimed it as his own and he was subsequently arrested and charged with illegal 
possession of a weapon.  Id.  The alleged victim was also arrested for obstruction of justice 
after explaining that it was her ex-boyfriend who has been making threatening phone calls.  
Id. 
151. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 32 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting). 
152. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers 
from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person 
within is in need of immediate aid.”) (emphasis added).  See also Mary Elisabeth Naumann, 
Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 333-34 (1999) (“Under the emergency aid doctrine, the officer has an 
immediate, reasonable belief that a serious, dangerous event is occurring. For example, the 
officer may believe someone needs necessary medical assistance at once, believe that life or 
safety is compromised, or think a crime victim needs protection.”). 
153. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93. 
154. State v. Harris, A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 50 
A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012). 
155. The court in State v. Edmonds stated this limitation on scope and time very 
succinctly: 
The emergency-aid doctrine, particularly when applied to the entry of a home, must 
be limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted the need for immediate 
action. Therefore, a police officer entering a home looking for a person injured or in 
danger may not expand the scope of the search by peering into drawers, cupboards, 
or wastepaper baskets. When the exigency that justifies immediate action dissipates, 
the rationale for searching without a warrant is no longer present. 
Edmonds, 47 A.3d at 746-47 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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B. The Community Caretaking Doctrine Does Not Apply to Searches 
Conducted Under Section 2C:25-28(j) of the PDVA 
The community caretaking doctrine is yet another exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment recognizing that police 
officers have duties beyond enforcing the law.156  This “wide range of 
social services” other than investigation and law enforcement consists of 
“aiding those in danger of harm, preserving property, and ‘creat[ing] and 
maintain[ing] a feeling of security in the community.’”157  Instances of 
the community caretaking function of the police are characterized by the 
following factors: (1) the scope of the function the police are performing 
is “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute”158 and (2) getting 
a warrant requires too much time.159 
A notably attractive facet of this doctrine is that in New Jersey, a 
secondary law enforcement purpose behind the search is not dispositive 
of the doctrine’s applicability.160  Even in the context of a criminal 
investigation that has already begun, police can still make warrantless 
entries into homes or vehicles that fall within the community caretaking 
exception.161  The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Bogan, stated: 
“We will not … handcuff police officers from fulfilling a clear 
community caretaking responsibility … merely because the officers are 
engaged in a concurrent criminal investigation.”162  The Bogan court 
went on to emphasize, “that the community caretaking responsibility 
must be a real one, and not a pretext to conduct an otherwise unlawful 
warrantless search.”163  Therefore, as long as the police’s primary 
function is community caretaking and not a pretext for a search, the 
reasonableness test will rule Fourth Amendment violations rather than 
 
156. See generally, Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1998). 
157. State v. Bogan, 975 A.2d 377, 384 (N.J. 2009) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Livingston, supra note 156, at 271-72). 
158. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
159. Edmonds, 47 A.3d at 751 (“In performing these [community caretaking] tasks, 
typically, there is not time to acquire a warrant when emergent circumstances arise and an 
immediate search is required to preserve life or property.”).  See also Livingston supra note 
156, at 274. 
160. For instance, the court in Diloreto found that, “[i]n addition to harboring safety 
concerns as caretakers, the police lawfully accumulated information to meet the probable 
cause and exigency standards before searching defendant's car.”  State v. Diloreto, 850 A.2d 
1226, 1237 (N.J. 2004). 
161. Bogan, 975 A.2d at 386. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
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the warrant and probable cause requirements, even during an active 
criminal investigation.164 
Interestingly enough, the most recent case in which the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found the community caretaking doctrine did not apply 
was an investigation of a report of domestic violence.165  In State v. 
Edmonds,166 the police entered the alleged victim’s house over her 
objections, and the court held that once the police had verified the safety 
of both her and her son, their community caretaking function was 
complete.167  In the words of the Edmonds court: “[i]f the officers 
wished to search the apartment for a gun, they had to apply for a warrant 
supported by probable cause.”168 
In Harris, as in Edmonds, there was no immediate danger to the 
community that the search was seeking to remedy, so the community 
caretaking doctrine would not have applied.169  Even though the 
secondary law enforcement purpose and use of the fruits of the search in 
a later criminal prosecution would not have condemned the search in 
Harris, there needed to be a situation necessitating a community 
caretaking function directly preceding the search.170  Therefore, while 
applicable in some domestic violence situations, in the situation which 
arose in Harris, as well as in most others that arise under section 2C:25-
28(j), the immediacy of the threat has passed. As a result, searches will 
 
164. Id. at 388-89 (analyzing the officers’ actions in the situation and finding them 
objectively reasonable and therefore constitutional).  Examples of cases in which New Jersey 
courts have found the community caretaking doctrine to apply include: Bogan, 975 A.2d at 
378-81 (warrantless entry into a home where 12-year-old child was supposedly home alone on 
a school day in order to talk to the child’s parents on the phone where officer spotted the 
suspect involved in a molestation the officer was investigating); Diloreto, 850 A.2d at 1232, 
1234-35 (defendant who had been mistakenly listed as an endangered missing person found 
asleep in his car near a known location for suicide attempts was patted down and found to 
have ammunition on him, and was subsequently charged and convicted of murder, an armed 
robbery of a gas station, and  possessory offenses regarding the weapons); and State v. Garbin, 
739 A.2d 1016, 1018-19 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. 1999) (warrantless search of a garage emitting 
smoke and the smell of burned rubber revealed defendant, who was then found guilty of 
driving while intoxicated). 
165. State v. Edmonds, 47 A.3d 737, 753 (N.J. 2012). 
166. As a point of interest, this case was decided 5-1, one month before State v. Harris, 
and perhaps unsurprisingly, Justice Albin, the author of the dissent in Harris, authored the 
majority opinion in Edmonds.  Id. at 737. 
167. Id. at 752. 
168. Id.  The single dissenting justice in Edmonds discussed the PDVA along with the 
importance of protecting domestic violence victims who might be shielding their own abusers 
and found the officers’ conduct in this case reasonable under both the community caretaking 
and the emergency aid exceptions.  Id. at 755-57 (Patterson, J., dissenting). 
169. Id. at 752 (majority opinion). 
170. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 20 (N.J. 2012). 
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not be excused from the requirement of a warrant supported with 
probable cause by the community caretaking doctrine.171 
In summary, the special needs exception is inapplicable,172 and 
none of the other exceptions to the warrant clause allow the search 
conducted in State v. Harris.  Both the emergency aid and the 
community caretaking exceptions fail because the immediacy of the 
threat to the alleged victim has already passed by the time the search is 
conducted.173  Because there is no exception to cover the searches 
conducted under a warrant based on reasonable cause pursuant to the 
PDVA section 2C:25-28(j), the Legislature should change the way the 
search warrants are issued in order to bring it into conformance with the 
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and 
Article I, Paragraph seven of the New Jersey Constitution. 
IV.  THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT WOULD BE JUST AS 
EFFECTIVE USING WARRANTS BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE 
This Note does not mean to undercut the gravity of protecting 
victims of domestic violence from abuse involving deadly weapons.  
The type of violence that led to the passing of laws like the PDVA is 
horrific and most deserving of a strong legal remedy.174  Indeed, many 
states have statutes restricting domestic abusers’ rights to bear arms.175  
The enforcement mechanisms vary among states; some ask for a 
voluntary surrender,176 some add on a penalty for failing to surrender the 
firearms,177 and some issue an order prohibiting possession without any 
 
171. Edmonds, 47 A.3d at 751. 
172. See supra Part II. 
173. See supra Parts III.A-B. 
174. See generally Benjamin Thomas Greer & Jeffrey G. Purvis, Judges Going Rogue: 
Constitutional Implications When Mandatory Firearm Restrictions Are Removed From 
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 275 (2011) (discussing 
the dangers of not enforcing firearms restrictions); Johnson, supra note 26 (recounting several 
problems with the former PDVA necessitating the complete overhaul); Memoli & Plotino, 
supra note 5 (discussing some of the cases and lapses in enforcement that led to the push to 
change the statute); Luo, supra note 5. 
175. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3602(E) (2010) (West); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit.10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A, § 4006 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., 
Fam. Law § 4-506 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002); N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT § 842a (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3.1 (2009). 
176. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-
3.1(a)  (2009); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842a (McKinney 2010). 
177. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (2010) (arrest for violation of the 
protection order); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3.1(j) (2009). 
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enforcement mechanism at all.178  New Jersey has been “progressive” in 
fighting domestic violence.179  But as the dissent in Harris notes, New 
Jersey stands completely alone in one aspect of its approach to weapons 
and domestic violence—it requires only reasonable cause to obtain a 
search warrant.180 
Part A of this section will briefly review the laws of states that take 
guns out of the hands of alleged abusers and how they operate in 
comparison with New Jersey’s PDVA.  Part B will recommend how the 
New Jersey’s legislature could bring the PDVA into conformance with 
the warrant clause without sacrificing the protection of potential victims 
of domestic violence. 
A. States Allowing Search Warrants for Weapons That Require 
Probable Cause in Domestic Violence Situations 
Only five states besides New Jersey authorize a warrant for the 
search and seizure of weapons in cases of domestic violence – Maine, 
Hawaii, California, New Hampshire, and Delaware.181  Each of those 
states, except Delaware, first orders the voluntary surrender of the 
weapons; only if the respondent fails to comply will a court authorize a 
search warrant.182  They also require the warrant to be based on probable 
cause specifically related to the weapons, not just the domestic 
violence.183  New Hampshire requires “probable cause to believe such 
firearms and ammunition and specified deadly weapons are kept on the 
premises or curtilage of the defendant and … reason to believe that all 
such firearms and ammunition and specified deadly weapons have not 
been relinquished by the defendant.”184  Maine goes a step further and 
requires probable cause to believe that the respondent has not 
 
178. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., Fam. Law § 
4-506 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (West 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842a 
(McKinney 2013). 
179. Memoli & Plotino, supra note 5, at 50. 
180. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 35-36 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting). 
181. Id. at 35.  See DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit.19-A, § 4006 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002). 
182. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A, § 4006(2-A) (2012); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002). 
183. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A, § 4006 (2-A) (2012); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002). 
184. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002). 
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relinquished the weapons.185  Hawaii requires police officers to apply for 
a regular search warrant if the respondent refuses to surrender the 
weapons in the absence of a consensual search of the premises.186  
California lists domestic violence among the grounds to obtain a regular 
search warrant for weapons and ammunition.187  Again, all of these 
statutes require not only probable cause, but also a failure of the 
respondent to voluntarily surrender their weapons in compliance with 
the court’s protective order.188 
Delaware’s statute is the only one comparable to New Jersey’s 
PDVA in that the search warrant can be authorized without the 
precondition of a failure to voluntarily surrender a weapon.189  But, as 
the dissent in Harris points out, Delaware requires a showing that: (1) 
the respondent possesses a firearm; (2) the “[p]etitioner can describe, 
with sufficient particularity, both the type and location of the firearm”; 
and (3) “[r]espondent has used or threatened to use a firearm against the 
petitioner, or the petitioner expresses a fear that the respondent may use 
a firearm against them.”190  Currently, section 2C:25-28(j) of the New 
Jersey PDVA contains no such nexus requirement between the 
possession of the weapon by an alleged domestic abuser and the threat it 
poses to the victim.191  The three-pronged standard of evaluation 
developed by the New Jersey appellate division in Johnson, and later 
adapted and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dispoto, does 
contain the requirement that the “defendant’s possession or access to that 
weapon poses a heightened or increased risk of danger to the victim.”192  




185. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A) (2012). 
186. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006). 
187. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011).  Though not explicitly stated in 
that section of the statute, a California court held that probable cause is the appropriate 
standard for the issuance of a search warrant under section 1524 in Frazzini v. Superior Court, 
7 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1012 (1970). 
188. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; ME .REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A) (2012); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002). 
189. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999). 
190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999). 
191. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 2005); State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 36 (N.J. 
2012) (Albin, J., dissenting). 
192. State v. Johnson, 799 A.2d 608, 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
193. Id.; see also supra Part I.B. 
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B. The New Jersey Prevention Against Domestic Violence Act Can 
Protect Victims Without Vitiating Constitutional Rights of 
Defendants 
The disparity between the approaches taken by New Jersey and 
other states does not necessarily mean that New Jersey needs to emulate 
any one of the other approaches; the PDVA and its application just need 
to conform to the requirements that warrants be based on probable cause 
contained in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and Article 
I, Paragraph seven of the New Jersey Constitution.194  The two 
dissenting justices in Harris offer a solution built on New Jersey case 
law that would protect victims from violence without violating the 
constitutional rights of defendants.195  Justice Albin wrote: 
[i]n my view, so long as the court makes a determination that there is 
(1) probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has 
been committed by the defendant; (2) probable cause to believe a 
search for and seizure of weapons is necessary to protect the life, 
health or well-being of a victim on whose behalf the relief is sought; 
and (3) probable cause to believe that the weapons are located in the 
place to be searched, a warrant issued under this statute is 
constitutionally sound.196 
This is simply an enhancement of the standard formulated in 
Johnson and Dispoto.197  The dissenting judges insist that the standard of 
probable cause in a domestic violence situation, while heightened in 
comparison to reasonable cause, “would be somewhat different than” 
that for a criminal search warrant.198  It would then appropriately cover 
prosecution for weapons found in plain view and violating sections of 
the criminal code, like those in Harris.199 
The New Jersey Legislature should alter section 2C:25-28(j) to 
include a test like the one proposed by the dissenting justices.  In fact, a 
bill attempting to alter this very section of the statute was introduced in 
January of 2012.200  The amendment to the statute would require that 
both civil and criminal complaints under the PDVA to be heard 
exclusively in superior court rather than municipal court.201  The 
 
194. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 7. 
195. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 36 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting). 




200. Assemb. B. 1105, 215th Leg., 2012 Sess. (N.J. 2012). 
201. Id. 
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Legislature has been willing to change the statute in the past to make it 
more effective202 and is already in the process of changing the 
procedures.203  Adjusting the burden of proof to enable a search and 
seizure warrant issued under the PDVA to comport with the federal and 
state constitutions is a necessary change well within the reach of the 
Legislature. 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is 
“the supreme Law of the Land,” not a suggestion that can be 
disregarded.204  Other states’ legislatures and courts have taken this into 
account when drafting and enforcing their statutes concerning the 
seizure of weapons in domestic violence situations.205  It is high time for 
New Jersey to do the same.  Domestic violence can be a heinous 
crime206 and absolutely deserves the strictest treatment and investigation 
possible, but this cannot and must not be accomplished at the expense of 
fundamental, constitutional rights.  Therefore, New Jersey’s courts 
and/or legislature must require warrants under the PDVA section 2C:25-
28(j)to show probable cause in regards not only to the act of domestic 
violence, but also to the possession of a deadly weapon and the threat it 
poses to the alleged victim.207 
CONCLUSION 
The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act’s issuance of a search 
and seizure warrant based on reasonable cause violates the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 
seven of the New Jersey Constitution.  Contrary to the majority’s 
holding in State v. Harris, the special-needs exception does not apply 
because: (1) the persons searched have no diminished expectation of 
privacy,208 and (2) obtaining a warrant is not impracticable in the 
 
202. Since the current version of the statute was enacted in 1991, the PDVA has been 
amended four times.  In fact, the warrant for the search and seizure was not part of the 1991 
statute; it was added in the first amendment, which was enacted in 1994. Crimes—Domestic 
Violence—Stalking, ch. 94, sec. 4, § 12 P.L. 1991, c. 261 (C. 2C:25–28(j)) (1994), amended 
by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 2005). 
203. Assemb. B. 1105, 215th Leg.,(N.J. 2012). 
204. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land”).  See also Article I, Paragraph 7 of New Jersey’s own state constitution, which 
contains its own formulation of the warrant clause, is also considered supreme. Byrnes v. 
Boulevard Comm'rs of Hudson County, 197 A. 667, 670 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1938) aff'd, 3 A.2d 456 
(1939) (“The supreme law of the state is its Constitution.”). 
205. See supra Part IV.A. 
206. See supra note 173. 
207. See supra Part IV.B. 
208. See supra Part II.B. 
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statutory scheme.209  Even if the special needs exception did apply, it 
would forgive the warrant entirely, not permit a warrant based on 
reasonable cause.210  Furthermore, other exceptions to the warrant 
clause, including the emergency aid doctrine and the community 
caretaking doctrine, which were not explored by the court, are equally 
unsuited to bring the statute into compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment.211 
The grave problem of domestic violence must be combated within 
the bounds of the Constitution.212  The warrant clause of the Constitution 
demands that there be probable cause as the basis for the warrant under 
the PDVA in regards to the threat of the weapon and the existence and 
location of the premises.213  The New Jersey legislature should rectify 
the problem by redrafting the language in the statute.  If New Jersey 
wants to preserve the right to prosecute for weapons violations 
discovered by these civil searches, then all it has to do is make sure that 
there is probable cause to issue the warrant to search.  Until the statutory 
language is fixed, New Jersey’s search and seizure of weapons with 
warrants based on reasonable cause under the PDVA will continue to 
violate the fundamental right of its citizens to be free from unreasonable 




209. See supra Part II.C. 
210. See supra Part II.D. 
211. See supra Parts III.A-B. 
212. See supra Part IV. 
213. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2. 
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